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Counting the Cost of Global Warming. BY JOHN BROOME. Cambridge, UK: White Horse
Press, 1992.
The Economics of Global Warming. BY WILLIAM R. CLINE. Washington: Institute for
International Economics, 1992.
Buying Greenhouse Insurance: The Economic Costs of CO2 Emission Limits. BY ALAN S.
MANNE AND RICHARD G. RICHELS. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
These three books deal with various aspects of the economics of global climate change
-- an issue of global scope involving potentially huge stakes, time horizons measured in
centuries, and deep scientific and economic uncertainties. William Cline's book provides a
critical assessment of much of the literature and an analysis of policy options. The shorter
monographs by John Broome and by Alan Manne and Richard Richels focus in more depth
on intertemporal comparisons and the costs of emissions reduction, respectively. Cline's book
is essential reading for economists any interest in global climate change, while the other two
studies deserve the attention of those with a research interest in this issue.
All three books begin with discussions of the large and diverse scientific literature on
global warming. Cline's is the most comprehensive discussion, but Cline's concern for
bottom-line policy conclusions often leads him to understate scientific uncertainty. For
instance, even though most scientists do not believe that it will be possible for years (for
computational and other reasons) to generate reliable long-term forecasts of regional climate
changes, Cline sometimes (e.g., p. 61-72) treats this problem as solved. Cline does not
always make it clear when he undertakes to settle debates among scientists or to extrapolate
beyond the scientific literature.
Cline argues persuasively that a long time horizon is appropriate in the analysis of
climate change. Most scientists agree that today's emissions of carbon dioxide (C02) will
increase the net amount of solar radiation absorbed by the earth (radiative forcing) for a
2century or more, and climate change appears likely to lag changes in radiative forcing by
decades. Analyses that do not look beyond the middle of the next century thus neglect much
of the climatic impact of even today's emissions. Unfortunately, the farther into the future
one tries to look, the greater the scientific and economic uncertainty one encounters. Cline's
best estimate (a serious extrapolation beyond the literature) is that without significant policy
changes, global average warming would peak at about 10*C (18TF) in about the year 2275, but
the corresponding subjective probability distribution is necessarily quite flat. Moreover,
global average warming is of little policy interest, and the regional changes that do matter are
considerably more uncertain.
Whether extending the horizon from 2050, say, to 2275 is likely to affect policy
conclusions materially depends critically on the discount rate employed. More generally, if
only because CO2 emissions have very long-lived effects on the atmosphere, choice of a
discount rate is critical to the analysis of climate change policy. Cline devotes a provocative
chapter to this issue and concludes that a relatively low real discount rate of 1.5% should be
used in this context.
Broome's monograph, the outgrowth of a "desk study" that he and David Ulph
prepared for the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), treats in more depth
discounting and related welfare-theoretic issues in the context of climate change. The original
study was apparently done under significant time pressure, and Broome's book provides more
of a critical survey than an attempt to break new ground. Whereas Cline puts bridges of one
sort or another across all swamps he encounters, Broome is generally content to erect warning
flags, indicating the need for more research, where solid bridges do not already exist.
3Broome attempts, with a good deal of success, to integrate the relevant philosophical literature
into a relatively non-technical and very clear exposition aimed primarily at economists.
Broome notes that policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions generally involve inter-
generational redistribution and that one cannot presume that either climate change or policies
to deal with it will have only a marginal impact on society. If only because catastrophic
shifts in weather patterns are at least conceivable, population sizes and average lifetimes are
logically endogenous. Broome's analysis begins with an illuminating general discussion of
relations among such concepts as justice, wellbeing, and preferences in such settings. If
nothing else, this discussion reveals how heavily conventional welfare economics depends on
generally unexamined philosophical conclusions.
Broome devotes a 60-page chapter to the question of discounting in the climate change
context. He argues that discounting costs and benefits using the consumer interest rate is
unjustifiable for several reasons, most importantly because future people do not participate in
today's markets and because global warming is (at least with some probability) not marginal.
He objects to using the producer interest rate even when government investment displaces
private investment, largely on the grounds that observed private rates of return exceed the
corresponding social rates of return because of unpriced externalities -- an objection that
seems to have more to do with practicality than with principle. Broome then deals with the
"pure" discount rate, the rate at which wellbeing is discounted in the objective function. He
argues from first principles that this rate should be zero. The analysis finishes with a
discussion of the treatment of population and lifetimes in the objective function; this
provocative discussion leads to no sharp conclusions.
4On the whole, Broome succeeds in his attempt "to bring some order to the questions,
rather than find answers." His monograph does not contain much specific methodological
guidance, but it should serve as a useful starting point for necessary welfare-theoretic research
on the proper treatment of intertemporal and, critically, intergenerational comparisons in the
context of climate change.
Cline devotes about 40% of his book to estimates of the costs and benefits of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions relative to baseline levels. Relatively little serious quantitative
work has been done on benefits -- that is, on the differences in the costs that would be
imposed by various rates and levels of climate change. Almost no quantitative analysis has
attempted to look beyond the next century or to value impacts of climate change on
unmanaged ecosystems. Cline tends to treat as likely the worst possibilities discussed in a
thin literature mainly concerned with what might happen in the 21st century. He then inflates
the corresponding damages to reflect the much greater warming he predicts over the following
200 years. While Cline's treatment is thus not exactly inconsistent with the existing
literature, his damage/benefit estimates seem clearly on the high end of the supportable range.
Cline's discussion of the costs of slowing climate change (and, in the very distant
future, perhaps reducing the peak change) considers both engineering and economic estimates
of the cost of reducing CO2 emissions. (Because there is essentially no literature on the costs
of reducing emissions of other greenhouse gases, Cline is forced to account for these costs by
scaling up the CO2 abatement cost estimates.) Cline attaches considerable weight to the
results in the Manne-Richels monograph, though he adjusts those cost estimates downwards to
reflect the large untapped potential for zero-cost energy conservation that engineers tend to
5see and economists tend to argue must be an illusion. Cline discusses transitional forestry
options at some length. (Only growing forests remove CO2 from the atmosphere; mature
forests store carbon.)
The Manne-Richels monograph describes Global 2100, a five-region, long-term,
energy-economy model, and uses it to analyze the effects of a range of emission reduction
scenarios during the 1990-2100 period. Even though Global 2100 is necessarily complex,
Manne and Richels present the main structural assumptions it embodies and the roles of its
key parameters very clearly. The Manne-Richels monograph is thus useful both because it
presents important and well-defended quantitative results and because it provides clear
discussions of important modeling issues.
Attempts to forecast the structure of the global economy through the end of the next
century necessarily involve a mixture of extrapolation and technology forecasting.
Computational and data constraints require that any global model embody significant
simplifications. In Global 2100, each region is modeled as a single regional individual with
perfect foresight using capital, labor, electrical energy, and non-electrical energy to produce
GDP using a putty-clay technology. Each regional individual maximizes the discounted
logarithm of consumption, using a 3% "pure" discount rate. Key production parameters are
the elasticity of substitution between energy and capital-labor aggregates (ESUB) and the rate
of autonomous energy-augmenting technical change (AEEI). The model is benchmarked so
that GDP growth rates in the absence of policy change equal the average of rates projected by
Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Global 2100 has a relatively detailed energy sector. Electrical energy may be
6produced by five existing technologies and four future technologies, two of which are carbon-
free backstops available in unlimited supply. There are nine technologies for producing non-
electrical energy, one of which is a carbon-free backstop. The costs assumed for the backstop
technologies (which are not otherwise described) act as important upper bounds on the costs
of reducing CO, emissions. The model allows for depletion and discovery of oil and gas
reserves and for international trade in oil and, in some runs, in rights to emit CO2.
Manne and Richels forecast baseline global CO2 emissions to increase by nearly a
factor of 7 between 1990 and 2100. U.S. emissions are projected to increase by about a
factor of 5; about 75% of global emissions growth is projected to occur outside the OECD
and the former USSR, most importantly in China and India.
Manne and Richels analyze the effects of restricting U.S. emissions to their 1990 level
through 2000, reducing them to 80% of this level by 2010, and stabilizing them thereafter. In
their base case, the relative GDP loss involved in satisfying this constraint at least cost (most
naturally by imposing a carbon tax) climbs to just over 2% by 2020, rises slowly to 2.5% by
2040, and, because of the availability of backstop supply technologies, remains roughly
constant thereafter. Manne and Richels show that these costs are quite sensitive to
assumptions about backstop parameters and the AEEI. Like most other contributors to the
abatement cost literature, Manne and Richels do not consider alternatives to cost-minimizing
policies, even though recent debates about energy policy and energy taxes in the U.S. and the
E.C. suggest very strongly that a simple tax on CO2 emissions is likely to be considerably less
attractive politically than more costly regulatory alternatives, such as stringent vehicle and
appliance efficiency standards.
7In another experiment, Manne and Richels treat total allowable U.S. emissions through
2050 as uncertain until 2020 and show that, depending on the probabilities attached to
alternative emissions limits, the value of improved information may be high. The Global
2100 model is shown to imply substantial international differences in the costs of CO2
emissions stabilization and significant potential gains from moving from national to global
emissions constraints (most naturally, by international trade in rights to emit C0 2). Manne
and Richels also note that realizing those gains is likely to require a significant flow of
resources from developed to developing nations.
Cline's comprehensive analysis culminates in a detailed, clearly presented evaluation
of an "aggressive" policy of reducing current global emissions (again, at least cost) by about
40% and holding them stable indefinitely. This policy goes well beyond those that have
dominated recent intergovernmental discussions. In Cline's preferred case, the benefit/cost
ratio is only 0.74, though it exceeds unity for some parameter combinations he considers
plausible. (Much depends on the discount rate and on how available damage estimates are
inflated to reflect greater warming in the distant future.) Cline argues that allowing for risk-
aversion serves to justify his aggressive policy.
In his final chapter, Cline discusses the serious obstacles to international
implementation of abatement policy and advocates focusing on relatively inexpensive actions
in the near term. Cline's discussion of what is feasible seems optimistic. Developing nations
typically have much more urgent concerns and are uninterested in devoting resources to
improving the climate their great-great-grandchildren will face. Only a few developed nations
have done anything but talk (in some cases loudly and at length) about reducing their own
8CO2 emissions. (Cline's assertion that the E.C. has adopted a carbon tax is, at best,
premature.) No donor nations have agreed to pay billions to help China and India use their
vast coal reserves more efficiently.
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